Understanding Nepal’s Madhesi movement and its future trajectory by Kantha, Pramod K.
Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy, Vol. 5, No.1, 2010 
 31 
 
Understanding Nepal’s Madhesi movement and its future trajectory 
   
Pramod K. Kantha7 
Wright State University  
 
In early 2007, Nepal’s hitherto sleepy Terai region became the 
epicenter of its continuing political turbulence. The Seven Party Alliance 
(SPA) of pro-democracy parties and the hitherto insurgent Maoists, known 
as the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) had signed a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006. As the two 
sides were forging a governing partnership, the country’s Terai region, 
home to almost half of Nepal’s population, was threatened by a violent 
movement that quickly engulfed the entire region. What had started as a 
protest against the exclusion of vital Madhesi issues (federalism, 
proportional representation etc.) from the just promulgated Interim 
Constitution turned into a massive rebellion resulting in the deaths of 
dozens of protesters. Spearheaded by a little known Madhesi civil society 
organization, the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF), the movement 
showed resilience and ferocity. First denounced by the SPA government 
and the Maoists as foreign-inspired and regressive, the government had to 
quickly accept many of the Madhesi demands.  
 
To date the Madhesi movement has several accomplishments to its 
credit. Thanks to this movement, federalism and regional autonomy have 
become central to the state restructuring, the victims of Madhesi protests 
have officially been recognized as martyrs, and the Madhesi parties gained 
the fourth and fifth positions in the Constituent Assembly Elections of 
April 2008, with important role in the volatile coalitional politics of the 
country. Never before had the Madhesi parties have so many seats in the 
national legislature. The Madhesi leaders since have occupied high profile 
positions: President, Vice-President, and, for a time the Foreign Minister.   
 
As Shahdevan (2003) points out, ethnic conflicts in South Asia tend to 
fester into “major wars marked by heavy loss of lives and destruction of 
property.”  The success of Nepal’s Madhesis in quickly ascending to 
power positions is an anomaly. Although the jury is still out on the longer 
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term trajectory of this movement, its achievements are noteworthy. How 
definitive is the success of the Madhesi movement and how does one 
explain its course? What was the nature of the Madhesi uprising? Has 
there been a real shift in the attitude of Nepali elites toward the Madhesi 
issues? Are the Madhesi issues likely to be resolved peacefully? Many 
such questions about the Madhesi movement remain still unanswered. 
During my field study in Nepal in July-August 2010, I posed some of 
these questions to numerous Madhesi politicians, civil society leaders and 
ordinary citizens. My paper combines my field study observations with 
scholarly research to examine the dynamics of Madhesi movement.  
 
 
Madhesis and the paradox of their marginalization in Nepal  
The Madhesis constitute 33 percent of the total population; however, 
Madhesi leaders have blamed the census for under recording the Madhesi 
population. They claim this percentage is well above 40 percent. Yet, 
defining a Madhesi is problematic. Excepting a minority of people 
indigenous to the region, people from both north and South (India) 
migrated into the Terai. It is in view of such migration pattern that Gaige 
(1975) called Terai as “geographically and culturally a transitional region 
between the hills and the plains (p. 11).” The only clear marker of 
Madhesis is their mother tongues, which are part of one of what Gaige 
calls “the plains language category.” This category includes Hindi, Urdu, 
Maithili, Bhojpuri, Bengali, the dialects of these languages such as 
Awadhi, and Morang Pradesh dialects and languages spoken by relatively 
few people such as Jhangar, Marwari, and Raji (p. 15). Lacking any other 
distinct socio-cultural markers as a group, the Madhesis clearly lack what 
Weber (1994) regarded as key elements of a nation, “common descent and 
homogeneity (p. 22).” How did the Madhesis unite to launch a powerful 
protest movement? How did the term Madhesi become a rallying factor? 
  
Exclusion is the key to understanding the formation of Madhesi 
identity. The history of this exclusion began with the formation of modern 
Nepal as a nation in 1769. Gaige (1975) highlights this when he writes, 
“hill people were given preference over plains people settled in the Tarai, 
so that the plains people were relegated to a second-class status.” For 
example, in the pre-1950 period, Madhesis needed passports to travel to 
the capital, Kathmandu. Discrimination against the plains people 
continued in the post 1950 era by “making the acquisition of citizenship 
more difficult for people of plains origin living in the Tarai (Gaige, 1975, 
p. 87-88).” Rajendra Mahato, a leader of Terai-based Nepal Sadbhavana 
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Party, highlights the discrimination in these words: The Terai people were 
alienated from the national bureaucracy, politics, army, civil service, etc. 
No more than five percent Teraians were represented in the police. No 
Teraians were represented at all in the army. And in bureaucracy itself, 
despite their population, less than five percent people were represented. So 
there was also imbalance in national politics and bureaucracy. There also 
was no adequate representation of Terai people in the parliament and 
politics. Even for the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections we are 
demanding that a proportional representation of the Terai people be 
accepted in candidature or membership of the political parties.8  
 
Nepal’s Madhesi nationalism supports Beissinger (1996)’s assertion 
that “nationalism achieves political potency only in the form of collective 
discourse, mass mobilization or state practice (p. 100).” Following 
multiparty democracy since 1990 various groups engaged in identity 
movements. However, as Lawoti (2008) finds, the representation of many 
underrepresented groups, including that of Madhesis, really declined 
during the democratic era of 1990-2002.  
 
The 2007 Movement and Its Achievements  
 As Varshney (2002) has pointed out, protests are more likely in 
democratic polities (p. 24-25). Madhesi movement erupted against the 
backdrop of the successful April Movement, which for Madhesis had 
bitter ironies. The future trajectory of the Madhesi movement will also be 
largely contingent upon the fate of Nepal’s still shaky political transition. 
The immediate spark for the Madhesi protests was provided by the 
promulgation of the Interim Constitution on January 15. The Interim 
Constitution was drafted exclusively by the members of the SPA and 
Maoists; the Madhesi leaders were left out. On January 16, 2007, the 
supporters of the MPRF showed their opposition to the promulgation of 
the constitution by burning its copies on the streets of Kathmandu. They 
opposed the constitution for omitting any reference to a federal structure 
and proportional electoral system. The government’s effort to suppress the 
movement failed and the movement spread quickly to most parts of the 
plain region; security forces killed dozens of protesters.  
 
                                                
8 Quoted from Text based on a presentation entitled “Violence in the Terai and the 
Madhesi Movement: Prospects for Peace in Nepal.” delivered by Minister Rajendra 
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http://www.nepalmonitor.com/2007/09/the_madhesi_movement_prospects_for_peace_in
_Nepal_-print.html 
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The Madhesi movement came in the wake of some critical 
developments. The Madhesi leaders found the peace deal with the Maoists 
as accentuating their marginalization. According to a highly placed 
political analyst, Madhesi leaders’ insignificant role in the drafting of the 
interim constitution followed a unified rejection by the major political 
parties of their demand for the reconfiguration of electoral districts on the 
universally recognized basis of population. Moreover, concessions to the 
Maoists had raised serious Madhesi objections. For example, the Asian 
Center for Human Rights (2009) reported Madhesi militants asking if the 
Maoists could pick up the gun and become members of parliament, why 
they could not do the same (p. 5).  Madhesi land owners suspected that the 
Maoists would grab more of their land to redistribute to their supporters, 
mostly the hill migrants. A badly handled riot in the western Nepali town 
of Nepalganj in the plain region on December 25-26, 2006 was another 
prelude to the movement. Sparked by confrontations between the 
supporters of the Madhes based Nepal Sadbhavana Party and those of the 
SPA, the riots’ victims were disproportionately Madhesis. A report by the 
People’s Level Civil Investigation Committee consisting of human rights 
groups found only 14 percent of the property destroyed in the riot 
belonged to the Pahadis. The most damaging for the government was the 
allegation that it abandoned what Esman (2004) would call “any pretense 
of impartiality in the face of ethnic disputes (p. 16).” The Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal (OHCHR) in a press 
release on October 22, 2007 also noted the accusation of “police acting 
partially” in Nepalganj agitations and in other Madhesi agitations in the 
months of January and February 2007. The government is yet to release 
the findings of an official investigation into the Nepalganj riot.   
 
From confrontation to compromise: How real a turnaround?   
The government was challenged by both pressures from the streets and 
a lack of any international support for its preferred policy of dealing 
forcefully with the Madhesi protests.  Nepal government pointed fingers at 
the Indian indifference to the activities of Madhesi militants from across 
the borders and sought Indian assistance in restoring normalcy in the plain 
region.  To Kathmandu’s disappointment, however, New Delhi urged the 
government to resolve Madhesis’ “genuine grievances.” A well informed 
source told me that India cautioned Nepal against using military to 
suppress the Madhesis by warning that it could create East Pakistan type 
situation that resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan and in creation of 
Bangladesh in 1971.  
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Still, the government only moved very slowly and hesitantly in making 
any concessions to the Madhesi leaders. Each round of concessions also 
marked a different stage for the Madhesi movement. The first such 
concession came through Prime Minister Girija P. Koirala’s address to the 
nation on February 9, 2007, which included the guarantee of a federal 
system after the CA election, a mixed-proportional electoral system, and a 
reconstitution of election constituencies in the Terai based on population. 
In response, the MPRF called off its strike but its protests continued 
demanding the resignation of the Home Minister, who the Madhesi leaders 
viewed as conniving with the Maoists against the Madhesi interests. These 
protests ended in August 2007 when the government agreed to a charter of 
22 MPRF demands; the MPRF since has accused the government of non-
implementation of many of these demands.  
 
The Madhesi movement entered another critical phase soon after the 
SPA reached a 23-point agreement in December 27, 2007 with the Maoists 
to end the Maoists’ boycott of the government and to hold the CA 
elections in April 2008. The agreement with the Maoists, however, 
accentuated the divide between the Madhesi and Pahadi leaders. The 
divide got a boost by the defection from the Nepali Congress of a senior 
Madhesi leader, Mahantha Thakur, who formed a new political party, the 
Terai-Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP); the party was formed on 
December 28, the day after the SPA reached agreement with the Maoists. 
The party started off amidst widespread rumor that its formation was 
inspired by India as a counterweight to the MPRF.    
 
The rise of a United Madhesi Democratic Front (UMDF) was a 
distinctive as well as an intriguing development of this phase of the 
Madhesi movement. The Front was formed on February 9 jointly by the 
MPRF, the Sadbhavana Party led by Rajendra Mahto, and the newly 
formed TMLP in order to galvanize the Madhesis. The Madhesi leaders 
deplored the failure of the government in implementing the 22-point 
agreement and called for fresh Terai agitation if their demands were not 
met by January 19. The UMDF also called for boycotting the CA elections 
unless their demands were met. The Madhesi groups also objected to the 
deployment of special police force in the Terai (Nepalnews 26 January 
2008). The Madhesi protests that followed left the Nepali government 
besieged and paralyzed. Widespread disruptions of transport and 
communication networks left Kathmandu without supplies, especially of 
petroleum products – a déjà vu for the capital’s residents who had seen 
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similar shortages resulting from the non-renewal of trade and transit treaty 
with India in 1989.   
 
On February 28, the UMDF and the government signed an eight-point 
agreement to end the nation-crippling indefinite strike in the Terai. 
Interestingly, the agreement was brokered by the outgoing Indian 
ambassador S. K. Mukherjee with the last round of negotiations being held 
in the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. The main stumbling block in the 
negotiations was the UMDF’s demand for a single autonomous Madhesh 
province stretching from Nepal’s Eastern most to Western most plain 
areas with the right to self determination. The agreement remains 
controversial to this day. The UMDF leaders claimed that the government 
accepted their demand of a single Madhes state whereas the government 
leaders sounded vague. Soon after the CA election, differences between 
the UMDF and SPA-M (the SPA and Maoist) leaders became more 
pronounced. Resentment at India’s role in the negotiations also appeared 
widely in the Nepali media. Some observers also noted a direct Indian role 
in the formation of the TMLP; yet another evidence of New Delhi’s 
increasing reliance on the Madhesi groups against the Maoists in view of 
the apparent inability of the SPA parties to resist the Maoist pressure 
(Thapa, 2008).  
 
Nepali Politics: The post-CA election scenario  
Unlike, Lijphart’s elite consensus-based approach, Nepali elites tend to 
favor brinkmanship to advance their interests. Hence, shifting and highly 
unpredictable elite interactions have been driven essentially by their 
respective electoral, street as well as disruptive capabilities. The Madhesis 
are the last to join Nepal’s power circle by using the combination of these 
capabilities, first gaining world attention through powerful street protests, 
and since the CA elections, by leveraging on their strength in the 
assembly. Nepal’s case resonates with Collier (2009)’s generalization 
from his broader study of the poorest and conflict prone countries that he 
calls the “bottom billion:” Instead of a shared sense of belonging, the state 
functions because its component groups are suspicious of each other and 
can use the institutions of accountability to prevent being disadvantaged. 
Such societies may not be cozy, but they are viable (p. 186). 
 
The Nepali case, however, is more complicated as it lacks any 
effective institutions of accountability barring an embattled judiciary 
fighting both allegations of massive corruption and attempts by politicians 
to undermine its independence. As a result, the ability of domestic 
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political actors to build and sustain a functioning state has been severely 
compromised leaving both Nepal’s peace process as well as governance in 
a state of limbo. Since the ouster of the Maoist-led coalition in May 2009, 
Nepali political parties have made very little progress on contentious 
issues like the rehabilitation of the Maoist combatants currently housed in 
the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) supervised cantonments, 
the division of power between the center and the provincial units under the 
proposed federal system, the demilitarization of the Maoists if they are to 
be part of a democratic process, etc. Unless the political parties reach a 
compromise, severe breakdown of the peace process may follow the 
termination of UNMIN mission in January 2011; nothing better 
exemplifies the political stalemate than the inability of the CA to elect a 
Prime Minister after more than sixteen rounds of voting.  
 
Political observers in Nepal hold both positive and negative views of 
Nepal’s current political imbroglio. Those on the applauding side view the 
current stalemate resulting from many complex issues that Nepali people 
and politicians have taken up and are seeking to resolve. They cite major 
breakthroughs like the end of the Maoist insurgency, the declaration of 
republic, and the massive mobilization of various sections of people for 
their fair share in the state restructuring as major cornerstones for Nepal’s 
new democracy. The pessimists have no less impressive litany of 
concerns. The pessimists are haunted by extreme political uncertainty and 
instability, which they consider as pointing strongly to looming state 
failure and chaos. Among the factors they blame for producing such a 
situation, the Maoists’ indeterminacy tops the list. The pessimists largely 
share the view that the Maoists have yet to convince other major political 
parties and international forces that their participation in the democratic 
process is not just a ploy to advancing their ultimate goal of establishing a 
one-party state. This failure, the pessimists point out, has been extremely 
counterproductive as it has made all non-Maoist political forces extremely 
dependent on Nepali army to defend themselves from feared Maoist 
onslaught; the Maoists’ is the only party that has its own army and tens of 
thousands of organized, disciplined and armed cadres. Nepali politics, 
thus, has come to be fixated on a single political agenda: keep the Maoists 
out. Even key foreign players in Nepal, mainly India and the United 
States, share and support this agenda of Nepal’s non-Maoist parties, thus, 
ossifying a polarization and uncertainty. 
 
There is a general alarm at the risk inherent in this political stalemate. 
Prof. Lok Raj Baral, a leading scholar of Nepali politics and the nation’s 
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former ambassador to India, described the current situation as the “biggest 
crisis in the country’s history.” He saw Nepal as suffering from “total 
dependence syndrome” with the state collapse scenario looking “closer 
than at any other time.”9 Another leading journalist expressed concern that 
Nepal is fast turning into a hotbed of international rivalries, primarily 
between India and China, but also as a diplomatic and military listening 
post for others.10  
 
Madhesi movement: The road ahead 
Madhesi leaders of Nepal consider the current political deadlock as a 
major setback to the Madhesi interests. Madhesi leaders regard the 
regularization of democratic process with the adoption of a constitution 
and the holding of national elections as key to structural reforms that will 
address the deep rooted grievances of the Madhesis. However, few of 
them are hopeful that this would happen. Madhesi leaders are of the view 
that the ruling elites of the major political parties, unsure of how to 
accommodate various conflicting demands, including those of the 
Madhesis, favor the current stalemate. Even a compromise among the 
major political parties, they bemoan, will do little to resolve the Madhesi 
issues. They regard   the mainstream parties as patently hypocritical; the 
major political parties, including the Maoists, oppose the idea of real 
decentralization of power under a federal set up. They believe that 
Kathmandu elites, overwhelmingly non-Madhesis, crave the now 
endangered centralized state that has allowed them to amass enormous 
power and wealth. A well connected Nepali scholar deeply involved in the 
constitution deliberation process corroborated such Madhesi apprehension 
by describing the ruling elites as being in a “state of siege;” their paralysis 
is explained by their nostalgia for the past and deep fear of what is to 
come. They are taking refuge in the current stalemate to postpone difficult 
decisions as long as possible.  
 
The Madhesi leaders’ outlook for the future exudes both confidence 
and alarm. Their confidence arises from the success of the Madhesi 
mobilization during the movement. The view that Kathmandu’s grip over 
Madhesh is a relic not current reality is widely held among Madhesi 
leaders and Madhesi population. In the current draft of the interim 
constitution this reality has been accepted by division of the Madhes 
region into three provinces. Although the projected federal structure does 
not meet the demand for a single unified Madhes province, Madhesis, 
                                                
9 Interview with the author in Kathmandu in August 2010 
10 Interview with the author in Kathmandu in August 2010  
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elites as well as commoners, believe that, 2007 movement was successful 
in asserting Madhesi identity. With more around 80 members in 
Constituent Assembly and demonstrated disruptive power of Madhes 
proven by the 2007 movement, the Madhes has forced itself into the center 
stage of Nepali politics.  
 
Yet, the Madhesi leaders are aware that there is no room for 
complacency. The benefits of this movement are yet to percolate to the 
popular level. Most demands of the Madhesi movement remain 
unimplemented. There is growing alienation in the Madhes, especially 
among the young Madhesis; Madhesi leaders are increasingly losing their 
support and are viewed as typical of Nepal’s “predatory elites,” the main 
beneficiaries of political changes. Several Madhesi lawmakers have 
expressed fear that another Madhesi movement is already brewing in the 
region. Life in the region is bedeviled by complete absence of law and 
order, disruption of business and industries and complete breakdown of 
institutions of governance and education. Lack of governmental authority 
in the region is compounded by corruption in the government and 
complicity of public officials and politicians with criminals (Jha, 2008).  
 
Growing power rivalry among the Madhesi parties has compromised 
the Madhesi leaders’ ability to unite behind the Madhesi issues. For 
example, the MPRF, the largest Madhesi party, has been rocked by 
defections and internal squabbles driven more by self interests than by 
differences over policies and issues. Reports of disaffection within the 
ranks and files with the party leadership’s penchant for power have also 
been in the news. In January 2009, for example, a group of 38 out of 52 
MJF lawmakers opposed their party members in the government by urging 
the Prime Minister to relieve them from their cabinet positions 
(Kantipuronline, January 6, 2009). The Madhesi leaders also have to 
contend with divisiveness of Madhesi identity from Terai groups that 
resent being labeled Madhesi. The Tharu and Muslims, for example, have 
engaged in persistent campaigns to protest such labeling and demand 
greater representation. In April 2009, the Maoist-led coalition agreed to 
address the demands put forth by the Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee 
(TJSC) to prevent their threatened series of protests. Hence, Madhesi 
leadership will have to operate in the context of its own diversity and 
cannot, to put it in Gorenberg (2000)’s words understood “entirely at the 
level of the whole ethnic group (p. 117).”   
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